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Anosognosia for hemiplegia is a common and striking disorder following stroke. Because it is typically transient and variable, it
remains poorly understood and has rarely been investigated at different times in a systematic manner. Our study evaluated a
prospective cohort of 58 patients with right-hemisphere stroke and significant motor deficit of the left hemibody, who were
examined using a comprehensive neuropsychological battery at 3 days (hyperacute), 1 week (subacute) and 6 months (chronic)
after stroke onset. Anosognosia for hemiplegia was frequent in the hyperacute phase (32%), but reduced by almost half 1 week
later (18%) and only rarely seen at 6 months (5%). Anosognosia for hemiplegia was correlated with the severity of several other
deficits, most notably losses in proprioception, extrapersonal spatial neglect and disorientation. While multiple regression
analyses highlighted proprioceptive loss as the most determinant factor for the hyperacute period, and visuospatial neglect
and disorientation as more determinant for the subacute phase, patients with both proprioceptive loss and neglect had signifi-
cantly higher incidence of anosognosia for hemiplegia than those with only one deficit or no deficits (although a few double
dissociations were observed). Personal neglect and frontal lobe tests showed no significant relation with anosognosia for
hemiplegia, nor did psychological traits such as optimism and mood. Moreover, anosognosia for neglect and prediction of
performance in non-motor tasks were unrelated to anosognosia for hemiplegia, suggesting distinct monitoring mechanisms for
each of these domains. Finally, by using a voxel-based statistical mapping method to identify lesions associated with a greater
severity of anosognosia, we found that damage to the insula (particularly its anterior part) and adjacent subcortical structures
was determinant for anosognosia for hemiplegia in the hyperacute period, while additional lesions in the premotor cortex,
cingulate gyrus, parietotemporal junction and medial temporal structures (hippocampus and amygdala) were associated with the
persistence of anosognosia for hemiplegia in the subacute phase. Taken together, these results suggest that anosognosia for
hemiplegia is likely to reflect a multi-component disorder due to lesions affecting a distributed set of brain regions, which can
lead to several co-existing deficits in sensation, attention, interoceptive bodily representations, motor programming, error
monitoring, memory and even affective processing, possibly with different combinations in different patients.
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Introduction
General background
Anosognosia (a: without; noso: disease; gnosia: knowledge) refers
to a lack of awareness of motor, visual or cognitive impairments in
patients with neurological disease (Berti et al., 1996). This striking
phenomenon occurs in various conditions such as hemiplegia,
hemianopia, cortical blindness, neglect, prosopagnosia, amnesia,
aphasia and dementia (Bogousslavsky and Clarke, 1998;
Vuilleumier, 2000). Historically, the term was introduced by
Babinski (1914) to refer to unawareness of hemiplegia.
Anosognosia for hemiplegia is not rare after stroke (Baier and
Karnath, 2005) and correlates with poor long-term outcome
(Gialanella and Mattioli, 1992; Hartman-Maei et al., 2001).
However, the neurological, cognitive and psychological factors
contributing to anosognosia for hemiplegia remain unclear.
Previous studies have not identified a consistent pattern of brain
lesion or dysfunction (Vuilleumier, 2004), except for a more
frequent occurrence after right than left-hemisphere damage
(e.g. Jehkonen et al., 2006). A similar right-hemisphere predom-
inance has been observed during Wada tests (Breier et al., 1995;
Carpenter et al., 1995). Recent attempts to determine more
precise neuroanatomical substrates have reported conflicting
results, pointing to a critical role of the posterior insula (Karnath
et al., 2005; Baier and Karnath, 2008) or premotor cortex (Berti
et al., 2005), but the reasons for such discrepancies remain
unclear.
Past neuropsychological studies suggest that anosognosia for
hemiplegia might not be a unitary phenomenon, since many
forms and degrees are encountered (for a review see
Vuilleumier, 2000). It can manifest independently at the verbal
and non-verbal levels, such that a patient who denies his hemi-
plegia may nevertheless behave adequately, for example by stay-
ing in bed. Conversely, other patients can verbally admit their
handicap but act as if it did not exist (Berti et al., 1996;
Ghika-Schmid et al., 1999). In addition, anosognosia can be se-
lective for one deficit while another disabling impairment may be
correctly recognized (Bisiach and Geminiani, 1991). Some patients
may acknowledge their deficit but show a lack of concern or
interest (anosodiaphoria; Babinski, 1914) as well as bizarre atti-
tudes or beliefs concerning their paralysed limb, such as a feeling
of non-belonging (asomatognosia) or delusional interpretations
(e.g. somatoparaphrenia; Gerstmann, 1942; misoplegia,
Critchley, 1962). Furthermore, anosognosia for hemiplegia is typ-
ically an acute phenomenon and tends to disappear within a few
hours or days after stroke onset, although exceptionally, it can
persist after the first 3 months (Heilman et al., 1998). This time-
course may explain the rarity of systematic investigations in large
samples, but also account for some divergence between previous
studies, and hamper direct comparisons between detailed
single-case studies conducted at different times post-stroke
onset. To our knowledge, no study has investigated patients
from an early hyperacute stage (53 days), when anosognosia
for hemiplegia is most common, to subsequent subacute and
chronic stages, when it has abated.
Anosognosia for hemiplegia: theoretical
issues
Many theories and speculations have been proposed to explain
anosognosia for hemiplegia over the last hundred years, but no
definitive and synthetic account has yet emerged. Several influen-
tial hypothesis were put forward based on single case studies (e.g.
Babinski, 1914; Heilman, 1991; Gold et al., 1994; Ramachandran,
1995) or purely speculative grounds (e.g. McGlynn and Schacter,
1989; Frith et al., 2000). The lack of unified theory suggests that a
single general mechanism is unlikely and that anosognosia for
hemiplegia may constitute a heterogeneous collection of disturb-
ances (Marcel et al., 2004) and/or a multi-componential disorder
(Vuilleumier, 2004) affecting bodily awareness.
Babinski (1914) had proposed a critical role for sensory deaffer-
entation, especially severe proprioceptive loss, however, this ex-
planation has proved insufficient since several studies have
reported dissociations between anosognosia for hemiplegia and
anaesthesia (Cutting, 1978; Bisiach et al., 1986; Marcel et al.,
2004) or proprioceptive loss (Willanger et al., 1981; Small and
Ellis, 1996). Likewise, anosognosia for hemiplegia is not reliably
correlated with the severity of motor weakness (Starkstein et al.,
1992; Small and Ellis, 1996; Marcel et al., 2004).
More recently, Heilman and collaborators (1991, 2000) pro-
posed a ‘feedforward’ or intentional theory of anosognosia for
hemiplegia. This influential hypothesis suggested that a unilateral
loss of motor intention for the affected limb (Heilman et al., 2000)
might disrupt some ‘feedforward’ signals that mediate internal
representations of motor actions and convey a subjective sensation
of volitional effort; in the absence of such intention signals, intern-
al comparator processes will fail to detect a mismatch between the
desired and the performed motor action and hence the patient will
fail to experience paralysis. In support of this idea, Gold et al.
(1994) reported a single patient with left hemiplegia and anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia in whom EMG recordings showed no con-
traction of pectoral muscles during attempts to move the left arm,
although these trunk muscles receive bilateral innervations and
should contract even in the presence of unilateral limb paralysis.
However, EMG measures in another patient with anosognosia for
hemiplegia found intact muscle activation during mental imagery
of bimanual actions (Hildebrandt and Zieger, 1995). Therefore,
impaired intentional motor mechanisms may not be sufficient, or
such deficit may arise in some patients only.
The presence of confusion and/or cognitive dysfunction has
been mentioned by several authors as a prerequisite for anosog-
nosia, although the exact nature of such dysfunction has remained
unclear or inconsistent. Weinstein and Kahn (1950) reported that
their anosognosic patients were always disoriented. Levine (1990)
formulated a ‘discovery theory’ of anosognosia for hemiplegia,
according to which cognitive deficits might contribute to denial
by preventing the detection of limb weakness when combined
with proprioceptive or sensory loss. However, the existence of
anosognosia for hemiplegia in patients with relatively preserved
mental capacities was emphasized very early on (e.g. Babinski,
1914; Joltrain, 1924), indicating that the disorder might result
from a more specific cognitive impairment rather than from
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global mental dysfunction (McGlynn and Schacter, 1989; Bisiach
and Geminiani, 1991).
An important cognitive deficit that might contribute to anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia is spatial neglect. Several studies found a
strong association between the two disorders (for reviews see
Feinberg, 1997; Vuilleumier, 2000). A suppression of perceptual
experience for one hemispace and/or hemibody due to spatial
neglect might arguably impair the ‘discovery’ of the deficit.
Moreover, vestibular stimulation can induce a transient recovery
from both anosognosia for hemiplegia and neglect (Cappa et al.,
1987; Rode et al., 1992). However, a number of findings suggest
that anosognosia for hemiplegia is not simply another manifest-
ation of spatial neglect. First, dissociations between the two con-
ditions have been reported (Bisiach et al., 1986; House and
Hodges, 1988; Small and Ellis, 1996; Dauriac-Le Masson et al.,
2002; Berti et al., 2005). Secondly, most patients with anosogno-
sia for hemiplegia and left neglect still deny their weakness even
when the affected limb is shown in the intact right side of space
(Lu et al., 2000). Finally, some patients who present with anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia during Wada test and right-hemisphere an-
aesthesia do not necessarily develop neglect (Adair et al., 1995).
Nevertheless, personal neglect or asomatognosia (rather than
extrapersonal neglect) might constitute more specific forms of
unawareness for one’s own body parts that could potentially
contribute to anosognosia for hemiplegia (Adair et al., 1995;
Baier and Karnath, 2008).
An association with frontal lobe deficits (i.e. motor impersis-
tence, mental flexibility, shifting abilities, etc) has also occasionally
been observed, raising the question of their causal implication in
anosognosia for hemiplegia (Starkstein et al., 1992). In a recent
study, Marcel and colleagues (2004) specifically tested the hy-
pothesis of deficient mental flexibility using classical executive
tests together with new procedures to assess self-monitoring abil-
ities. Patients were asked to evaluate their own performance,
based on expectations and observed outcome, for both mental
and sensorimotor tasks. Results showed no significant association
between anosognosia for hemiplegia and scores on classic
frontal-lobe tests, but patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia
typically overestimated their performance before execution, sug-
gesting that such estimation may rely on premorbid expectations
and beliefs rather than on actual state. Moreover, when
self-estimation was again probed after an attempt or actual exe-
cution of the task, patients with left hemisphere lesions usually
corrected their initial overestimation while patients with
right-hemisphere lesions showed insufficient adjustment of their
first judgement. In any case, the fact that some patients may
deny a deficit while recognizing another neurological problem sug-
gests that their lack of awareness is not associated with a general
alteration of mental flexibility, but may rather involve a more spe-
cific ability to adjust knowledge and behaviour based on a direct
‘first-person’ experience (Marcel et al., 2004; Vuilleumier, 2004).
Anosognosia has also been considered as an unconscious de-
fence mechanism allowing patients to ignore the distress caused
by their illness. Indeed, anosognosic behaviour may occur in other
non-neurological conditions, such as coronary infarction and
cancer (Caplan and Shechter, 1987). Even healthy people show
a ‘natural optimistic bias’ (Diener and Diener, 1996; Beatrice and
Brugger, 2002); thus Weinstein and Kahn (1955) suggested that
anosognosia for hemiplegia might reflect a psychologically moti-
vated denial, due to premorbid personality traits and emotional
factors. Other evidence suggests some covert knowledge and ef-
fortful inhibition of attention towards deficit-related information
(Nardone et al., 2007). However, several clinical observations do
not support psychological defence as a major causal mechanism in
most cases. Anosognosia is, for example, almost never associated
with peripheral neurological disorders that also lead to invalidating
paralysis. Furthermore, anosognosia can dissociate between differ-
ent limbs and deficits within the same patient. The transient
disappearance of denial during vestibular stimulation (Cappa
et al., 1987; Rode et al., 1992) is also difficult to explain with
purely psychological factors. Finally, several studies failed to iden-
tify specific premorbid personality traits in patients with anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia (Levine et al., 1991; Starkstein et al., 1992;
Small and Ellis, 1996). Nevertheless, the role of emotional and
motivational factors associated with anosognosia still remains to
be more fully explored. Babinski himself noted the relationship
between anosognosia for hemiplegia and lack of affective concern
(anosodiaphoria). Weinstein and Kahn (1955) emphasized a
reduced anxiety, lack of catastrophic reactions and affable
attitudes. Other emotional changes have often been reported,
including inappropriate cheerfulness and jocularity (Gainotti,
1972), apathy (Cutting, 1978, Levine et al., 1991), but also
depression (Starkstein et al., 1990, 1992). It is possible that
some brain lesions may alter emotional processes implicated in
self-monitoring and adjustment to illness (Vuilleumier, 2004;
Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010), but the exact nature of these
changes is unknown.
Still another cognitive model was proposed by McGlynn and
Schacter (1989), who postulated a disruption between sensori-
motor or perceptual modules on one hand, and the posterior ‘con-
scious awareness system’ or the ‘anterior executive system’
involving parietal and frontal association cortices, respectively, on
the other. Accordingly, unawareness of perceptual and motor def-
icits (e.g. anosognosia for hemiplegia) would occur after parietal
lobe damage, whereas unawareness of more complex deficits (e.g.
problem solving or memory information) would result from pre-
frontal damage. However, this framework does not easily account
for the fact that patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia are
often not simply unaware, or ‘disconnected’ from, their hemibody
impairment, but also seem strikingly ‘reluctant’ (or unable) to
accept their failure even when directly confronted during clinical
examination (Barre´ et al., 1923; Critchley, 1953). The mechanism
for this ‘resistance’ has still to be elucidated and might relate to
additional damage to self-monitoring systems.
Finally, in keeping with the ‘discovery’ theory (Levine, 1990), it
has been recently proposed that anosognosia for hemiplegia may
not result from a single cognitive deficit, but rather constitute a
heterogeneous collection of disturbances (Marcel, et al., 2004) or
a multi-componential disorder due to the synergetic effects of
distinct deficits (Vuilleumier, 2004; Davies et al., 2005) Thus, vari-
ous kinds of impairments might affect a set of appreciation, belief
and check abilities (ABC model; Vuilleumier, 2004) or involve a
combination of abnormal experience and delusional interpretation
(Davies et al., 2005). Impaired ‘appreciation’ (A) might result from
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various deficits altering the subjective experience of a given
function (e.g. moving), due to sensory deafferentation, neglect,
completion or phantom sensation, but anosognosia for hemiplegia
would emerge only when additional deficits in putative belief
(B) and check (C) systems can prevent the verification and
discounting of the distorted experiential evidence and/or lead to
delusional interpretations. Whether such verification and reality
monitoring abilities rely on specific neural substrates associated
with error detection and uncertainty monitoring (Falkenstein
et al., 2000; Vocat et al., 2008) still remains unresolved (Vocat
and Vuilleumier, 2010).
Our research
The current study concentrated on anosognosia for hemiplegia
only, because it is the most common and most impressive form
of anosognosia. Our aim was to evaluate the incidence, clinical
presentation, timecourse and neuroanatomical correlates of ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia in a large, unselected cohort of patients
with left hemiplegia following right-hemisphere damage. For the
first time, to our knowledge, we investigated patients with
right-hemisphere stroke using a systematic battery of tests at dif-
ferent time points, using a prospective protocol from the hyper-
acute (53 days) and subacute (7–10 days) stages after stroke until
the more chronic stage (6 months). Specifically, we sought to
determine whether anosognosia for hemiplegia was associated
with any consistent pattern of clinical and anatomical features,
by testing for (i) elementary neurological and neuropsychological
disorders; (ii) mood and affective disturbances; (iii) timecourse of
symptoms and (iv) anatomical sites of lesions.
Materials and methods
Recruitment of patients
We prospectively screened all patients who were admitted to
Lausanne or Geneva University Hospitals after a first focal stroke
(haemorrhagic or ischaemic), for an 18-month period (October 2005
to April 2007). Because many patients with left hemisphere damage
have language problems that could disrupt their understanding or per-
formance during testing, we recruited only patients who had a
right-hemispheric stroke and a significant left arm motor impairment
(see below for a description of the testing and rating scale used).
Patients without objective motor deficits were not studied further.
We also excluded patients with other neurological or psychiatric his-
tory, as well as those who could not be assessed appropriately (major
confusion, severe clouding of consciousness or uncontrollable agita-
tion). Overall, these criteria resulted in a group of 58 patients out of
a total of 337 patients with right-hemisphere damage. Informed con-
sent to participate was obtained from the patients or relatives accord-
ing to regulations of the local ethics committee.
A primary evaluation was performed during the first 3 days after
stroke (hyperacute phase), while a second assessment took place
1 week later (7–10 days, subacute phase) and a third final testing
was administered at 6 months (chronic phase).
Assessment in the hyperacute and
subacute phases
A wide range of tests was administered to investigate awareness of
the motor deficit, but also several neurological (e.g. motricity, proprio-
ception, vigilance), neuropsychological (e.g. neglect, memory, mental
flexibility) and psychological (e.g. mood, personality) factors that
might contribute to anosognosia for hemiplegia. All tests were
chosen to be given at the bedside to all patients, across a wide
range of stroke severity. However, to maximize sensitivity, some of
the tests differed at the different assessment phases (hyperacute, sub-
acute, chronic; see below).
Awareness testing
To take into account the variability of anosognosia for hemiplegia, we
employed two separate scales to measure awareness of motor deficits
at two different moments during each evaluation: the classical
‘4-points’ score introduced by Bisiach (1968) and a new scale,
constructed from three existing instruments.
The first measure involved a score ranging from 0 to 3, reflecting
the level of inquiry at which the motor deficit is acknowledged by the
patient: after a general question; after a specific question about the
limb; or after confrontation with a requested motor action. To rate
anosognosia for hemiplegia in patients with mild impairment, ques-
tions were modified according to the severity of the deficit. For in-
stance, if a patient with moderate weakness reported ‘I have slight
difficulties in moving my arm’, he was scored 0 but if he stated ‘I can
move my arm’, another question was systematically added: ‘can you
move your arm as usual?’. If the patient replied ‘yes’ to this question,
a confrontation test was carried out and the Bisiach score was even-
tually rated 2 (for a report of a mild difficulty) or 3 (for a persistent
lack of acknowledgment). But if the answer to this question was ‘no,
my movements are more difficult than usual’, the Bisiach score was
rated 1.
Our second measure was based on the Anosognosia for Hemiplegia
Questionnaire of Feinberg et al. (2000) and included additional items
from the structured interview of Nathanson et al. (1952) and the
structured questionnaire of Cutting (1978). These items investigated
other aspects of awareness such as the reasons for hospitalization,
description of limb function or sensations (e.g. paralysed, weak or
tired). This new scale will be referred to as the modified Feinberg
scale and may provide a finer measure of the severity and nature of
unawareness than the Bisiach scale (ranging from 0 to 11 points).
The Bisiach scale was always administered first to each patient, while
the modified Feinberg scale was evaluated at the end of the neuro-
logical examination. To combine these two measures into a unique
score for our analyses (in order to strengthen the reliability of subse-
quent correlation tests), we computed z-scores for each subject on
each scale and then created a mean z-score value for each subject
(subsequently designated as a ‘composite’ score of anosognosia for
hemiplegia). This global score allowed us to obtain a reliable quanti-
tative estimate of anosognosia for hemiplegia, taking into account
some fluctuations in time and variability across patients, and providing
a more ‘continuous’ scale than a dichotomous separation between
anosognosics versus nosognosics. This score was thus used only for
statistical purposes. Nevertheless, we note that using either the Bisiach
or our modified Feinberg scale alone would not modify the general
pattern of results described below. For all further statistical analyses,
the measure of anosognosia for hemiplegia was always (if not specif-
ically noted otherwise) based on this composite score.
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In addition, we also used a measure of anosognosia for hemiplegia
adapted from the confrontation procedure of Marcel (2004) and Berti
(1996). We selected two unimanual tasks (drinking a glass of water
and combing the hair) and two bimanual tasks (applauding and open-
ing a bottle) on which the patients were asked to rate their perform-
ance from 0 to 10 before and after having to execute them (with the
left and right hand separately for unimanual tasks). The patient’s
self-evaluations were subtracted from those of the clinician (to reflect
the degree of anosognosia for hemiplegia) and averaged over the four
tasks involving the left, paralysed limb, resulting in a separate score for
each of the three evaluation moments (before, just after and 15 min
after attempts to perform the task).
Finally, we also recorded a complementary exploratory measure of
the subjective experience of symptom onset by the patients. To obtain
an approximate (but systematic) assessment of this subjective experi-
ence, the patients were asked (in an open interview) during the hyper-
acute period to describe a posteriori their symptoms at the very onset
of the stroke. Although potentially affected by vigilance and memory
dysfunction, this exploratory measure might provide a unique proxy
for the degree of awareness at this exact moment. We were particu-
larly interested in verifying if some patients who were nosognosic
3 days after stroke nonetheless showed evidence of anosognosia at
the time of symptom onset. Three aspects were systematically probed
in their verbal report: (i) the perceived severity of motor deficit; (ii) the
emotional reaction triggered by this event and (iii) the spontaneous
attribution of causality to experienced symptoms. The reports were
then rated according to these three aspects (0 for full, 1 for incomplete
and 2 for absent report of the expected correct experience).
Related phenomena
We adapted the questionnaire of Cutting (1978) to probe for various
disorders in bodily awareness, often associated with anosognosia for
hemiplegia, including anosodiaphoria, feeling of non-belonging,
strangeness, misoplegia, personification, somaesthesic and kinaesthesic
hallucinations, as well as supernumerary phantom illusions. Each of
these phenomena was rated as clearly present (score 2), slightly pre-
sent (score 1) or absent (score 0).
Neurological testing
Motor strength of both arms was assessed by asking the patient to
hold each upper limb straight in front of him for 5 s. Weakness was
rated according to five levels: 0 = normal; 1 = slight fall of the arm;
2 = complete fall of the arm; 3 = inability to lift the limb but with
weak residual movements and 4 = no movement of the arm at all.
We considered that a patient presented a significant motor impairment
of the left arm when he scored 1 on this scale.
Tactile sensation was measured using three repetitions of two types
of stimulation (touch or sting) on two sites (hand or elbow), i.e.
12 stimulations in total. Discrimination errors on each stimulation was
scored as 0 (correct report of site and stimulation type), 1 (wrong site
or wrong stimulation type) or 2 (both site and stimulation type wrong).
The scores of 12 stimulation trials were then summed.
Proprioception was assessed by applying a small movement at three
joints (middle finger, wrist and elbow), three times each.
Discrimination of the direction of movement was rated 0 (correct) or
1 (wrong) for a total score ranging from 0 to 9.
Vigilance was rated 0 if the patient was spontaneously awake and
active, 1 if reactive but slow and 2 if unable to maintain vigilance.
Orientation was tested for personal, temporal and spatial domains
(from 0 to 3, one point for errors in each domain).
Perceptual extinction was assessed in two different modalities:
(i) visual (by making small finger movements across the two hemifields)
and (ii) tactile (by light touches on each hand, with eyes closed).
For each modality, four stimulations were delivered on the right, left
and both sides, in random order. The measurement of visual and/or
tactile extinction was not performed if the patient presented with
hemianopia and/or complete hemianaesthesia (no detection of uni-
lateral stimulation), respectively. Motor extinction was also assessed
by asking the patient to raise his shoulders (in random order; four
times each on the right, left and both sides simultaneously). By
testing proximal movements, this procedure provides a measure of
motor initiation and intentional function during unilateral and bilat-
eral actions even in the presence of distal weakness (Coslett and
Heilman, 1989). In all extinction tests one point was scored for each
omission.
Neuropsychological testing
Unilateral visuospatial neglect was assessed with several standard tests:
star cancellation (subtest of the Behavioral Inattention Test; Wilson
et al., 1987), line bisection (Schenkenberg et al., 1980) and copy of
the Gainotti–Ogden figure (Ogden, 1985). Reading of a short text of
four lines was also examined (number of words omitted on the left
side). In addition to measures on each test, a ‘composite’ score of
visuospatial neglect was derived from these four tasks by calculating
the z-scores for each patient in each task and then their average.
Personal neglect (impaired awareness of the contralesional side of
the body) was evaluated according to the procedure of Bisiach et al.
(1986), by asking the patient to reach his left arm with his right hand.
Performance was rated on a scale of four levels: 0 for a quick reach;
1 if the right arm crossed the trunk midline but did not reach the left;
2 for a movement towards the left arm without crossing of the midline
and 3 for no movement of the right arm.
To examine mental flexibility, two tasks of verbal fluency were used
(categorical: names of animals; phonological: words that begin with
the letter ‘M’; lasting 1 min each). Scores were corrected according to
age and socio-economic level following standard norms (Thuillard and
Assal, 1991). We also followed the procedure of Marcel et al. (2004)
to assess self-monitoring of non-motor performance by requesting the
patients to estimate their fluency performance (i.e. number of items
produced) before, just after and 15 min after the task. To quantify the
patients’ tendency to over/underestimate themselves, we subtracted
these estimations from their real performances and computed a mean
for the two fluency tasks. Mental flexibility and reasoning were also
assessed with a category sorting task (Weigl, 1927), in which subjects
have to classify a set of shapes according to different criteria. The
higher the number of correct classifications, the better the perform-
ance (scores range from 0 to 4).
Short-term memory was examined with a classical verbal span task
(Wechsler, 1981). As for the verbal fluency tasks, scores were cor-
rected according to age and socio-economic level following standard
norms (Thuillard and Assal, 1991). General long-term memory capa-
cities were probed with a very simple test that could be easily
performed in the hyperacute phase: patients had to memorize three
words [from the Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE); Folstein
et al., 1975] and retrieve them after 5 min. One point was scored
for each word.
Because the clinical condition of patients generally improved after
the hyperacute stage, a few other tests were added to the second
assessment in the subacute phase. Global cognitive functioning was
measured by the MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975). Finally, the Catherine
Bergego scale (Azouvi et al., 2003) was used to provide a standardized
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assessment of neglect behaviour in everyday life. This evaluation
involved ratings of several daily actions and situations by both the
patient and the nursing staff. A score of anosognosia was computed
as the difference between the nurse (hetero-evaluation) and the pa-
tient’s ratings (auto-evaluation).
Psychological testing
To assess the role of affective factors in the ability of patients to ac-
knowledge their deficits, we obtained several measures of mood and
emotional reactivity using standard rating scales. In the hyperacute
phase, we administrate a shortened version of the analogical visual
scale of Norris (Norris, 1971; Guelfi et al., 1989), which includes,
among other mental states, measures of alertness, anxiety, optimism,
concerns, mood and aggressiveness. We also included two specific
questions about general worries related to the current medical situ-
ation and ongoing diagnostic investigations. A second custom-made
scale was designed to be completed by carers and probed various
domains of affective behaviour and reactions, including depression,
anxiety, irritability, concern about illness, confabulations and hallucin-
ations (Aybek et al., 2005). The latter ratings were based on the fre-
quency of each behaviour and ranged from 0 (absent) to 3 (always
present).
Finally, in the subacute phase, we also administrated the Life
Orientation Test (Scheier and Carver, 1985; Scheier et al., 1994)
that provides a measure of dispositional optimism, defined in terms
of generalized outcome expectancies.
Follow-up testing
In the chronic phase (6 months post-stroke), we made a final assess-
ment to investigate long-term outcome of patients with or without
anosognosia. In addition to testing awareness of the motor deficit
(Bisiach, Feinberg scales), we assessed awareness of visuospatial neg-
lect using the Catherine Bergego scale (Azouvi et al., 2003), as well as
other remaining neurological deficits (motricity, sensation, propriocep-
tion, hemianopia, perceptual and motor extinction) and general neuro-
psychological functioning (orientation, neglect, memory, global
cognitive abilities) using a procedure similar to those in the hyperacute
and subacute phases. In addition, a few other measures were specif-
ically obtained in the chronic phase, including the modified Rankin
scale (Rankin, 1957) to evaluate handicap in daily life and the
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (Hamilton, 1967) to evaluate the
presence and severity of mood changes.
Statistics
In order to determine relationships between the severity of anosogno-
sia for hemiplegia (as measured by our composite score) and other
measures derived from the neurological or neuropsychological tests,
we used non-parametrical correlation analyses that were most appro-
priate given the asymmetrical distribution of our data (Howell, 2008).
The rho of Spearman was employed, with the significant threshold
fixed at P50.05. Since these non-parametric tests are conservative,
no correction for multiple comparisons was applied.
These correlations were then backed up by multiple regression ana-
lyses, including different tests in a single statistical model. To do so, we
compensated the inherently asymmetrical distribution of our data by
using ranks in place of raw scores, and then performed classical linear
regressions. In order to balance the number of variables explored
against the number of samples (patients), we selected only scores
from tests with the greatest theoretical relevance or showing
significant correlations in preceding non-parametric tests. These se-
lected variables included the composite score of anosognosia for hemi-
plegia (Bisiach and modified Feinberg; taken as the dependant variable
for the regression analysis), plus somatosensory, proprioceptive and
motor deficits, visuospatial neglect (composite score), perceptual and
motor extinction, spatiotemporal orientation, verbal fluency (composite
score from the two tasks), digit span and the word-memory task.
We also explored the evolution of each deficit over time, by inspect-
ing changes in performance between the hyperacute and subacute
phases. To allow a direct comparison between different deficits we
again used z-scores (calculated for both periods together), which pro-
vided us with values corresponding to the severity of the deficit in
different domains but now independent of the time of the evaluation
and the range of their initial scale. Then, by subtracting the z-scores of
each subject for both periods (subacute minus hyperacute), we could
estimate the relative decrease of a particular deficit over time. These
measures of ‘decreases’ on a particular test were then compared with
‘decreases’ on other tests (using paired Wilcoxon tests, with a signifi-
cant threshold at P50.05). These comparisons enabled us to test
whether any deficit showed a significantly greater/smaller decrease
compared to the others. To explore whether some deficits showed a
similar pattern of decrease as anosognosia for hemiplegia, we also
calculated Spearman correlations between these ‘decreases’ and ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia scores. Thus, we could estimate which deficits
might evolve in parallel to the recovery timecourse of anosognosia for
hemiplegia.
Lesion analysis
The location and extent of brain damage was delineated in each pa-
tient, based on their CT scan (n= 35) or MRI scan (n= 23), obtained
after the first week post-stroke (9 days on average) and then recon-
structed on a standardized brain template with the MRIcro software
(Rorden and Brett, 2000). This anatomical procedure was carried out
by a trained neuropsychologist and subsequently verified by a neur-
ologist in a double-blind manner (neither of these two investigators
knew the scores of the patient in the different tests). The volume of
lesions was also measured with MRIcro for each patient. The obtained
lesions (regions of interest) were then submitted to voxel-based
lesion-symptom mapping (VLSM, Bates et al., 2003; Verdon and
Vuilleumier, 2010) in order to determine the critical brain regions
implicated in anosognosia for hemiplegia. To this aim, we performed
VLSM analysis using the composite scores of anosognosia for hemi-
plegia (averaged z-scores from the different scales), obtained for both
the hyperacute and subacute phases. A similar procedure was applied
to identify brain lesions associated with spatial neglect (using the com-
posite neglect score).
An important advantage of VLSM (compared to traditional lesion
overlap or group subtraction) is that it does not require patients to be
classified dichotomously by lesion site or by arbitrary behavioural
cut-offs. Statistical analyses of the relationship between tissue
damage and behaviour (e.g. anosognosia for hemiplegia) are carried
out on a voxel-by-voxel basis using a continuous rating of perform-
ance. At each voxel, patients are divided into two groups according to
whether their lesion region of interest does or does not include that
particular voxel. The performance of the two groups (test scores) are
then compared at each voxel (with t-test), and the resultant statistics
(t-values) are coded along a corresponding colour scale and mapped
onto the standardized anatomical brain template (Bates et al., 2003;
Verdon and Vuilleumier, 2010).
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Results
Recruitment and severity of motor
deficit
We screened a total of 337 patients with acute stroke, among
whom 58 had motor deficits and were included for subsequent
testing. Exclusions were mostly due to insufficient physical symp-
toms (i.e. no paresis), excessive vigilance disorder or past neuro-
logical history (previous stroke or other cerebral disease). Fifty
patients (22 females; mean age: 65 14 years; all right-handed)
were examined in the hyperacute phase [mean: 2.71 days, stand-
ard deviation (SD): 0.79, range: 1–5] and 44 patients (22 females;
mean age: 63 13 years; all right-handed) examined in the sub-
acute phase (mean: 8.34 days, SD: 1.37, range: 7–12). For clinical
reasons, 14 patients from the hyperacute phase could not be seen
in the subacute phase (36 patients participated in both phases)
and eight new patients were admitted only during the subacute
phase. Only 19 patients (9 females; mean age: 59 13 years; all
right-handed) could be examined again in the chronic phase
(mean: 223 days, SD: 61, range: 180–273). In all, 14 patients
participated in all three evaluations.
Among patients who were recruited for further investigation of
anosognosia for hemiplegia, the severity of motor weakness in the
arm was measured at each testing session on a 5-level scale (see
‘Materials and methods’ section) from 0 (no motor deficit) to
4 (complete plegia); scores were found to improve significantly
in the chronic stage only. The mean motor deficit score was
2.84 in the hyperacute phase (SD: 1.21, range: 1–4), 2.55 in
the subacute phase (SD: 1.58, range: 0–4) and 1.16 in the chronic
phase (SD: 1.50, range: 0–4). The mean motor weakness was not
significantly different between the hyperacute and the subacute
phases [t(88) = 1.033, P= 0.328] but became less important in the
chronic phase compared to the subacute phase [t(57) = 3.248,
P= 0.002] or the hyperacute phase [t(67) = 3.575, P50.001].
Correlations with the severity of anosognosia for hemiplegia are
reported below. However, all patients from the hyperacute phase
showed some motor impairment (see inclusion criteria in the
‘Materials and methods’ section), while three out of the 44
patients had an important motor recovery in the subacute
phase, such that their strength appeared almost normal and
their level of motor awareness was difficult to gauge with
simple verbal questionnaires. Likewise, in the chronic phase, a
similar motor improvement was observed in five out of 19 pa-
tients. Nevertheless, these patients were included in our analysis
in the corresponding phase in order to avoid any overestimation of
anosognosia for hemiplegia in later stages (since some patients
with persisting weakness could also become nosognosic) and to
ensure a longitudinal view of anosognosia for hemiplegia among
patients with a right-hemispheric lesion and significant hemiplegia
at onset.
Prevalence of anosognosia
In the hyperacute phase, 50% of patients with motor weakness
showed no anosognosia for hemiplegia and thus scored 0
on Bisiach scale (Fig. 1). Another 18% scored 1, while 14%
scored 2 and 18% scored 3. Hence, a third of patients presented
with a clear lack of awareness of their motor deficits (scores 2 and
3, Baier and Karnath, 2005). In the subacute phase, 57% of
patients scored 0; 25% scored 1; 11% scored 2 and 7% scored 3.
By contrast, in the chronic phase, the majority (89%) now
scored 0, with only 6% scoring 1, none scoring 2 and a single
patient scoring 3 (5%). When considering only those patients
with a significant motor deficit persisting beyond the initial
examination (the majority of cases), the percentages were very
similar: the subacute phase showed 52% of patients scoring 0;
28% scoring 1; 13% scoring 2; and 8% scoring 3, whereas the
chronic phase showed 86% scoring 0; 7% scoring 1; 0% scoring
2 and 7% scoring 3.
Results from the modified Feinberg scale showed that in the
hyperacute phase, the mean score was 2.18 (2.75) and 44%
of patients were rated40, indicating some degree of anosognosia.
In the subsequent subacute phase, the mean score was reduced to
1.53 (2.23) but still 38% of patients were rated40. All patients
had a score of 0 in the chronic phase except for one. This mod-
ified scale was reliably correlated with Bisiach scale for both the
hyperacute (r= 0.818, P50.001) and subacute (r= 0.758,
P50.001) phases.
Furthermore, results from our open interview on the remem-
bered subjective experience at stroke onset revealed that only
35% of patients were able to adequately describe the onset of
their symptoms (Fig. 1). Most often, they failed to correctly lat-
eralize the deficits (e.g. ‘my two legs couldn’t lift me’) or they
minimized them (e.g. ‘I had difficulties walking’ while the report
of observers clearly mentioned that the patient fell to the ground).
Interestingly, only 26% of cases described an emotional response
at symptom onset, while many patients reported a lack of
emotions (‘I felt calm and everything was OK’) or inappropriate
emotions (‘I said to myself that it would go back to normal in a
few hours’). Accordingly, many patients did not think about asking
for help and almost two thirds (63%) mentioned that they did not
believe in a neurological cause at the onset of symptoms.
Although these reports were obtained a posteriori, and thus po-
tentially confounded by impairments in memory and/or vigilance,
they suggest that anosognosia for hemiplegia may be extremely
common at the very onset, despite the frequent abruptness of
deficits.
Other measures of self-monitoring and
awareness
In the confrontation test of Marcel et al. (2004), where patients
must predict and evaluate their performance on unimanual and
bimanual actions, overestimations were observed only for unim-
anual tasks with the left/impaired hand and for bimanual tasks.
None of the patients showed overestimation in unimanual tasks
with the right/unimpaired hand. Therefore, we report only data
for unilateral left and bimanual actions (combined; no significant
difference between the two conditions). Our results indicate that,
in the hyperacute phase, only 16% of patients gave a plausible
estimation (score 1 relative to the clinician’s evaluation) prior to
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attempting the motor task (33% just after and 34% 15 min later),
while 69% of them overestimated their motor capability (54% just
after and 47% 15 min later). In the subacute phase, 23% of pa-
tients provided accurate estimations (28% both just after and
15 min later), but 52% still made overestimations despite having
ample time for confrontations in their daily life (53% just after and
55% 15 min later). Only one patient over-rated his motor per-
formance in the chronic phase.
In the hyperacute phase, the mean difference between patient
and clinician evaluation (patient score minus clinician score, on a
scale of 0–10) was 2.74 points (3.94) before the action, 2.19
(3.02) just after and 2.15 (3.40) 15 min later. In the subacute
phase, these discrepancy values were 1.74 (3.37), 1.30 (2.35)
and 1.69 (2.63), respectively. None of these three values was
significantly different from those in the hyperacute period (before:
t= 1.303, P= 0.196; just after: t= 0.793, P= 0.430, 15 min later:
t=0.193, P= 0.848). Auto-evaluations of motor actions in the
Marcel task were highly correlated with anosognosia for hemiple-
gia as measured by either Bisiach scale or our modified Feinberg
score, for both the hyperacute and subacute phases
(0.5975 r50.763, all P50.001).
By contrast, auto-evaluations of patients in the verbal fluency
task appeared relatively normal. Indeed, the difference between
the number of words given in their evaluation and those actually
produced, in the hyperacute phase, was 4.07 (12.23) before the
fluency task, 1.92 (8.83) just after and 3.38 (13.41) 15 min later.
In the subacute phase, these differences were 2.81 (8.70),
1.60 (7.84) and 2.12 (8.98), respectively. These auto-evaluations
of fluency performance were unrelated to anosognosia for hemiple-
gia scores (neither composite nor Bisiach or modified Feinberg scales
alone) at any time point (0.1705 r50.169, 0.3075P50.874).
Neither were they significantly linked with motor auto-evaluations in
the Marcel task (0.1905 r50.318, 0.1305P50.974).
Finally, awareness of spatial neglect in the Bergego scale
showed a marked discrepancy between patients and the nursing
staff during the subacute phase (r= 0.169, P= 0.430). However,
the chronic phase showed a strong relation (r= 0.935, P50.001)
and indicated a good awareness of neglect consequences on daily
activities. Interestingly, awareness of neglect was not significantly
correlated with awareness of the motor deficit (anosognosia for
hemiplegia composite score) in both phases (r= 0.338, P= 0.098
and r= 0.567, P= 0.111, respectively).
Related disorders of bodily awareness
Distortions in body or limb perception were common in all stages.
In the hyperacute phase, 62% of patients reported some disorder
of bodily awareness. The most common phenomena were anoso-
diaphoria (44%), kinaesthetic illusions (26%), strange feelings
(14%), non-belonging (12%), misoplegia (10%), personification
(8%) and supernumerary phantom (8%). Anosognosia for hemi-
plegia was significantly correlated with anosodiaphoria (r= 0.445,
P50.001), but only weakly associated with kinaesthetic illusions
Figure 1 Evolution of awareness for the motor deficit over time (from stroke onset through to subsequent follow-up). Anosognosia for
hemiplegia at stroke onset was estimated retrospectively (according to two levels: present or incomplete/absent), based on the report of
remembered symptoms made by the patient during subsequent interview (in the hyperacute period). In the three other periods,
anosognosia was estimated during a clinical exam and is illustrated here according to the procedure of Bisiach (four levels, see ‘Materials
and methods’ section)—the impairment is reported after a general question (in green), after a specific question about the arm (in yellow),
after motor confrontation (in orange) or not reported despite motor confrontation (in red). The purple line marks the separation between
patients considered as anosognosics (Bisiach scores of 2 and 3) and those who were not (Bisiach scores of 0 and 1; Baier and Karnath,
2005). Anosognosia was present in almost two thirds of the patients at onset, but in one-third after 3 days, and in one-fifth 1 week later.
After 6 months, severe anosognosia persisted only rarely.
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(r= 0.215, P= 0.090) and not related to the other phenomena
(0.1455P51.000).
In the subacute phase, 58% of patients still showed related
disorders. Again, they often described anosodiaphoria (36%), kin-
aesthetic illusions (27%), strange feelings (13%), misoplegia
(13%), personification (13%), non-belonging (8%) and super-
numerary phantom (8%). The presence of anosognosia for hemi-
plegia now showed strong correlations with kinaesthetic illusions
(r= 0.395, P= 0.003) and non-belonging (r= 0.351, P= 0.009),
but a weaker correlation with anosodiaphoria (r= 0.268,
P= 0.042) and no relation with the other phenomena
(0.5845P50.929).
Finally, even in the chronic phase, at least one related
phenomena was still present in 42% of the patients, including
kinaesthetic illusions (31%), anosodiaphoria (21%), strange
feelings (16%), misoplegia (10%) and non-belonging (5%). No
personification or supernumerary phantoms were reported.
Correlations with other neurological and
neuropsychological deficits
To explore the role of various neurological and neuropsychological
deficits in the emergence of anosognosia for hemiplegia, we
examined the pattern of correlations between these deficits and
the severity of anosognosia for hemiplegia (as measured by our
composite score combining Bisiach and other scales), using
non-parametric rho Spearman tests.
In the hyperacute phase, almost all of our neurological variables
were significantly correlated with the severity of anosognosia
(Table 1). While correlation with motor weakness was modest
(r= 0.331, P= 0.019), there were stronger correlations with tactile
loss (r= 0.603, P50.001) and proprioceptive loss (r= 0.620,
P50.001; with similar effects for proprioception measured at
the finger, wrist or elbow), but also correlations with hemianopia
(r= 0.539, P50.001), visual extinction (r= 0.510, P= 0.003), tact-
ile extinction (r= 0.504, P= 0.009) and low vigilance (r= 0.322,
P= 0.023). The subacute phase showed similar results for weak-
ness (r= 0.338, P= 0.033), tactile deficit (r= 0.397, P= 0.009),
proprioceptive deficit (r= 0.358, P= 0.020), hemianopia
(r= 0.313, P= 0.038), visual extinction (r= 0.564, P50.001) and
vigilance (r= 0.373, P= 0.013). Only tactile extinction (r= 0.351,
P= 0.100) was no longer correlated with anosognosia for hemi-
plegia. Interestingly, motor extinction did not show any clear
relation in both phases (r50.388, P40.05).
Among the neuropsychological variables, the severity of ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia exhibited significant associations with spa-
tiotemporal disorientation (r= 0.398, P= 0.004 and r= 0.572,
P50.001) and visuospatial neglect (r= 0.551, P50.001 and
r= 0.600, P50.001) for both the hyperacute and the subacute
phases, respectively. Memory performance on the three-word
recall task also showed a trend in the hyperacute phase
(r= 0.265, P= 0.082) that became significant in the subacute
phase (r= 0.364, P= 0.018), whereas personal neglect was mar-
ginally significant in the hyperacute phase (r= 0.288, P= 0.045)
but not in the subacute phase (r=0.043, P= 0.782). By contrast,
all other neuropsychological tests (memory span, verbal fluency,
mental flexibility) did not show any relationship with anosognosia
for hemiplegia, either in the hyperacute or subacute phases
(0.1585 r50.267, 0.1165P50.844). However, the measure
of global cognitive dysfunction (MMSE) in the subacute phase was
significantly linked to the severity of anosognosia for hemiplegia
(r= 0.481, P= 0.001).
None of the psychological and affective dimensions obtained by
self-reports (e.g. mood, anxiety, personality traits; Table 1)
showed a significant relationship with anosognosia for hemiplegia
(0.2855 r50.181, 0.0915P50.969). For hetero-reports by
nurses in the hyperacute phase, we found that patients with ano-
sognosia were rated as less interested in their care (r=0.422,
P= 0.022), less worried (r=0.402, P= 0.042), more passive
(r= 0.530, P= 0.004) and presenting more frequent confabulations
(r= 0.507, P= 0.004). They were also considered as being more
indifferent to their condition (r= 0.356, P= 0.058).
All other behaviour and mood traits (e.g. sadness, aggressive-
ness, crying; Table 1) showed no significant relation
(0.3475 r50.202, 0.0895P50.823). However, in the sub-
acute phase, only the rating of ‘indifference to condition’ reached
significance (r= 0.422, P= 0.036), while the presence of confabu-
lations still showed a tendency (r= 0.395, P= 0.069); but none of
the other ratings were significantly related to anosognosia for
hemiplegia (0.2865 r50.284, 0.1695P50.870). Finally, the
questionnaire of optimism (Life Orientation Test) indicated no
association with the measure of anosognosia for hemiplegia
(r= 0.127, P= 0.565).
In the chronic phase, only one patient still showed a full-blown
anosognosia (Bisiach score of 3). However, using a more graded
measure based on the composite score of anosognosia for hemi-
plegia, we found significant correlations with neglect (r= 0.532,
P= 0.019), spatiotemporal disorientation (r= 0.704, P= 0.001)
and MMSE (r= 0.463, P= 0.046). There was no relation with the
severity of tactile (r= 0.098, P= 0.699) or proprioceptive
(r= 0.216, P= 0.406) impairments, nor with the measure of de-
pression (Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; r= 0.197, P= 0.420).
Interestingly however, the correlation between a measure of
handicap (Rankin) and anosognosia for hemiplegia was almost
significant (r= 0.450, P= 0.053).
Finally, because it is possible that a more unitary pattern of
factors associated with anosognosia for hemiplegia might be
found when the motor loss is more complete and severe, we re-
peated our analyses using only the subgroup of patients with a
complete hemiplegia. This subgroup included 21 patients in the
hyperacute phase and 18 patients in the subacute phase (only two
patients remained completely hemiplegic in the chronic phase,
preventing any statistical analyses for that period). We found glo-
bally similar results as above. For the hyperacute phase, anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia was significantly correlated with sensation
(r= 0.485, P= 0.030), proprioception (r= 0.746, P50.001), visual
extinction (r= 0.814, P= 0.004), visuospatial neglect (r= 0.718,
P= 0.019) and memory (r=0.452, P= 0.045), but not
with other neurological (0.2485 r50.401, 0.0715P50.306)
or neuropsychological variables (0.1455 r50.420,
0.1065P50.543). No psychological measure reached signifi-
cance (0.0295 r50.467, 0.1265P50.920). For the subacute
period, these correlations failed to reach significance because too
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Table 1 Correlations of anosognosia for hemiplegia with other disorders
Hyperacute Subacute Chronic
r P r P r P
Neurological
Motricity 0.331 0.019 0.338 0.033 0.159 0.515
Sensation 0.603 0.000 0.397 0.009 0.098 0.699
Proprioception 0.620 0.000 0.358 0.020 0.216 0.406
Vigilance 0.322 0.023 0.373 0.013 – –
Hemianopia 0.539 0.000 0.313 0.038 0.438 0.061
Visual extinction 0.510 0.003 0.564 0.000 0.412 0.089
Tactile extinction 0.504 0.009 0.351 0.100 0.208 0.407
Motor extinction 0.319 0.148 0.388 0.055 0.347 0.205
Handicap—Rankin – – – – 0.450 0.053
Neuropsychological
MMSE – – 0.481 0.001 0.463 0.046
Orientation 0.398 0.004 0.572 0.000 0.704 0.001
Memory—MMSE 0.265 0.082 0.364 0.018 0.469 0.043
Personal neglect 0.288 0.045 0.043 0.782 – –
Visuo-spatial neglect 0.551 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.532 0.019
Span 0.072 0.634 0.267 0.116 – –
Subtraction—MMSE – – 0.158 0.317 0.166 0.497
Flexibility – – 0.038 0.844 – –
Verbal fluency 0.091 0.581 0.184 0.275 – –
Psychological
Patient—depressed 0.039 0.797 0.079 0.627 – –
Patient—sleepy 0.058 0.735 0.031 0.861 – –
Patient—calm 0.220 0.191 0.181 0.305 – –
Patient—woolly 0.046 0.785 0.122 0.494 – –
Patient—clumsy 0.045 0.796 0.045 0.801 – –
Patient—sluggish 0.075 0.662 0.046 0.795 – –
Patient—displeased 0.162 0.339 0.073 0.683 – –
Patient—anxious 0.033 0.850 0.136 0.442 – –
Patient—slow minded 0.091 0.596 0.029 0.870 – –
Patient—tensed 0.285 0.091 0.080 0.654 – –
Patient—absent-minded 0.146 0.403 0.067 0.706 – –
Patient—incapable 0.015 0.933 0.090 0.612 – –
Patient—unhappy 0.022 0.900 0.107 0.545 – –
Patient—hostile 0.202 0.243 0.057 0.749 – –
Patient—annoyed 0.135 0.440 0.081 0.648 – –
Patient—withdrawn 0.193 0.267 0.167 0.347 – –
Patient—concerned 0.067 0.702 0.061 0.732 – –
Patient—worried 0.007 0.969 0.049 0.784 – –
Nurses—sad 0.044 0.823 0.054 0.797 – –
Nurses—aggressive 0.202 0.292 – – – –
Nurses—interested 0.422 0.022 0.209 0.326 – –
Nurses—euphoric 0.120 0.536 0.035 0.870 – –
Nurses—hallucinations 0.119 0.530 – – – –
Nurses—worried 0.402 0.042 0.286 0.186 – –
Nurses—crying 0.347 0.089 0.064 0.771 – –
Nurses—getting angry 0.048 0.810 0.106 0.615 – –
Nurses—passive 0.530 0.004 0.284 0.169 – –
Nurses—disinhibited 0.051 0.792 0.213 0.340 – –
Nurses—confabulations 0.507 0.004 0.395 0.069 – –
Nurses—catastrophic reaction 0.056 0.778 0.158 0.494 – –
Nurses—indifferent 0.356 0.058 0.422 0.036 – –
Optimism – – 0.127 0.565 – –
Depression—HDRS – – – – 0.197 0.420
r values are non-parametric Spearman rho values for the correlation of deficits with the severity of anosognosia for hemiplegia (as measured by the composite score) for
each examination phase separately. Significant correlations are highlighted in bold. HDRS = Hamilton Depression Rating Scale.
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few patients (n= 18) could be incorporated in the analysis, but
relevant trends were observed between anosognosia for hemiple-
gia and visual extinction (r= 0.488, P= 0.075), visuospatial neglect
(r= 0.441, P= 0.067) and global cognitive functioning (MMSE;
r=0.472, P= 0.056). Sensation (r= 0.067, P= 0.793) and
proprioception (r= 0.034, P= 0.894) showed no significant rela-
tionship in this period.
Multiple regression analysis
To take into account the different variables simultaneously, we ran a
multiple linear regression in which we entered the main neurological
and neuropsychological factors that were theoretically relevant or
found to be significant in simple correlations above (see ‘Materials
and methods’ section), together with the severity of anosognosia for
hemiplegia (composite score) as the dependent variable.
For the hyperacute phase, the regression model revealed
that proprioceptive loss was the only single significant deficit
(t= 3.443, P= 0.003) that explained the severity of anosognosia
for hemiplegia, independent of all other factors. None of the
latter reached significance in this multiple regression analysis
(1.1915 t51.494, 0.1535P50.791), including the degree
of visuospatial neglect (t= 1.852, P= 0.809). However, for the
subacute phase, a different model emerged although the
same variables were entered in the analysis. The most significant
factors now included visuospatial neglect (composite
score, t= 2.605, P= 0.013) and spatiotemporal disorientation
(t= 2.397, P= 0.021). All other variables were not significant
(1.1995 t51.360, 0.1815P50.973), including propriocep-
tion (t= 1.758, P= 0.937). These two neuropsychological factors
were also correlated with the temporal evolution of anosognosia
for hemiplegia, as described below.
Temporal evolution of the deficits
To examine how deficits improved from the hyperacute to the
subacute period and whether some improvements were disso-
ciated or correlated, we compared the changes in anosognosia
for hemiplegia (based on the composite score) with those in all
tests that showed a significant correlation in our analyses above (in
either the hyperacute or subacute phases). Pairwise Wilcoxon tests
indicated no significant difference (0.1135P50.962) between the
degree of change among these tests (differences in z-scores from
the two phases), indicating that all tests showed a similar amount
of improvement over time (from the hyperacute to the subacute
period).
Nevertheless, when looking at the pattern of parallel decreases
within individual participants, using non-parametric Spearman cor-
relation tests, we found that the recovery of proprioceptive loss
(r= 0.373, P= 0.042), hemianopia (r= 0.442, P= 0.013), visuo-
spatial neglect (r= 0.412, P= 0.026) and spatiotemporal disorien-
tation (r= 0.344, P= 0.043) were significantly associated with the
degree of improvement in anosognosia for hemiplegia. Thus, only
these deficits tended to show a systematic parallel temporal evo-
lution with respect to anosognosia for hemiplegia.
Dissociations and associations
of deficits
Despite strong relationships between anosognosia for hemiplegia
and other neurological or neuropsychological deficits (see above),
some patients showed clear double dissociations. For example,
eight patients with a maximum score of proprioceptive loss had
a Bisiach score of 0. But conversely, one patient who was ano-
sognosic (Bisiach score = 2, modified Feinberg score = 6) could still
correctly report most of the proprioceptive stimuli (score = 0).
Likewise, one patient with severe neglect was completely aware
of his recent motor incapacity, whereas another with no sign of
neglect on the four different tests claimed that he could move his
left arm normally despite severe hemiplegia. These cases with
anosognosia for hemiplegia but without deficit of proprioception
or visuospatial neglect suggest that these deficits play a relative
but not unique role in the emergence of anosognosia for hemi-
plegia, even though they are strongly correlated.
To test for a summation of different deficits, we also examined
whether patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia but milder pro-
prioceptive loss had more pronounced deficits in other dimensions.
However, patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia (Bisiach score
of 2 and 3) and showing the least important proprioceptive loss
(below the median score of all anosognosics) did not have more
severe impairment in neglect or other tests relative to anosogno-
sics with higher proprioceptive loss (above the median score). The
same result was obtained when comparing proprioception loss in
anosognosics who had the lowest (below the median) compared
to the most severe (above the median) scores in the neglect test.
This was found for both hyperacute and subacute phases.
However, because anosognosics usually had severe deficits on
many tests, the subgroups with relatively spared function in a
given domain usually contained only a few patients (n= 2–6),
which could potentially limit these comparisons.
In fact, the number of deficits presented by a single patient,
rather than just their nature, was found to be a relevant factor.
Indeed, when considering that a given deficit was ‘present’ if the
patient scored above the median of the whole group, we observed
a highly significant correlation between the number of deficits and
anosognosia for hemiplegia (r= 0.635, P50.001), for both evalu-
ation phases (Fig. 2). Nevertheless, some combinations might pro-
duce a stronger impact on awareness of plegia than others. In
particular, patients who had both severe neglect and severe pro-
prioceptive loss (above the median) exhibited anosognosia for
hemiplegia much more frequently (14/18 and 11/15) as opposed
to patients who had only one of these deficits (8/16 and 6/14) or
none (2/14 and 4/15; 246.74, P50.034 for the hyperacute
and subacute phases, respectively). These deficits may therefore
add up (or interact) to produce anosognosia for hemiplegia.
Finally, to determine whether anosognosia for hemiplegia
co-occurred with a specific pattern of deficits, we ran a factorial
analysis in which z-scores from main neurological, neuropsycho-
logical and psychological tests were included together. This analysis
revealed that deficits in the hyperacute phase reflected four main
underlying components (Table 2). The first component included
anosognosia for hemiplegia scores and overestimation in the
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Marcel task, together with most other clinical deficits including
neglect, proprioceptive loss, tactile loss, visual extinction, hemian-
opia and orientation. A second component was specific to mood
and anxiety, the third specific to memory (three-word recall)
and the fourth specific to personal hemineglect. The factorial
analysis for the subacute phase revealed the same four underlying
components (Table 2). Again, the first component included anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia scores and overestimation in the Marcel task
together with neglect, proprioception, tactile loss, weakness, visual
extinction and disorientation, whereas the second was specific to
mood, the third specific to memory (three-word recall) and the
fourth related to personal neglect. Thus, anosognosia for hemiplegia
was generally associated with the occurrence of other neurological
and neuropsychological disorders, but did not segregate into a
distinct factor.
Anatomical lesion analysis
To check the validity of our approach, we first performed VLSM
analyses investigating the neuroanatomical lesions that correlated
with the severity of motor weakness and spatial neglect, in both
hyperacute and subacute phases (Rorden and Karnath, 2004;
Verdon and Vuilleumier, 2010). As expected, these analyses
showed that the precentral motor cortex and the anterior part
of the internal capsula were critically associated with the severity
of paralysis in both the hyperacute and subacute phases
(not shown). Likewise, for spatial neglect (composite score),
VLSM highlighted critical regions in the posterior parietal lobe
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for both time periods, plus
the temporoparietal junction in the subacute phase (Fig. 3A
and B).
Figure 2 Mean Bisiach scores according to the number of deficits presented by patients. The deficit was considered as present if the
patient scored above the median of the whole group. Ten deficits showing the strongest correlations with severity of anosognosia for
hemiplegia (AHP) were taken into account here: tactile loss, proprioceptive loss, hemianopia, visual extinction, motor extinction, vigilance
alteration, disorientation, memory impairment, extrapersonal neglect and personal neglect.
Table 2 Factorial analysis
Factors Hyperacute Subacute
I II III IV I II III IV
Anosognosia for hemiplegia 0.793 0.719
Marcel overestimation 0.831 0.776
Tactile loss 0.849 0.716
Proprioceptive loss 0.834 0.747
Hemianopia 0.728 0.581
Visual extinction 0.715 0.704
Neglect 0.771 0.814
Disorientation 0.675 0.687
Depression 0.813 0.841
Anxiety 0.693 0.598
Irritability 0.868 0.742
Memory 0.737 0.557
Personal neglect 0.607 0.644
Deficits with a coefficient loading40.50 on a given factor are shown for each factor and each examination phase.
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We then determined the crucial regions associated with anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia in both periods, using the same approach
(Fig. 4A and B). For the hyperacute phase, the severity of ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia (as measured by the composite score) was
correlated with damage in several brain regions, including the
anterior and inferior portions of the insula (partly extending into
the claustrum and putamen), together with the anterior internal
capsula, rostral caudate nucleus and paraventricular white matter
of the right hemisphere. For the subacute phase, additional
regions were also found to be involved in the premotor cortex,
dorsal cingulate, parietotemporal junction, hippocampus and
amygdala.
Finally, we also tested for an effect of the size of brain damage
(as determined by the number of voxels composing the lesion
regions of interest in MRIcro software). The relationship with
severity of anosognosia for hemiplegia was not significant in the
hyperacute phase (r= 0.297, P= 0.084) but highly significant in
the subacute phase (r= 0.565, P= 0.001).
Figure 4 Voxel-based lesion mapping of anosognosia for left hemiplegia. Brain regions where damage was significantly related to the
severity of anosognosia for hemiplegia in the hyperacute phase (A) and in the subacute phase (B). The voxels highlighted are those that
show a significant difference (t42.7, P50.01, false discovery rate corrected) in the composite scores of anosognosia for hemiplegia
between patients with or without a lesion in these voxels. L = left; R = right.
Figure 3 Voxel-based lesion mapping of left extrapersonal neglect for the hyperacute (A) and the subacute (B) phases. The voxels
highlighted are those that show a significant difference (t43.5, P50.001, false discovery rate corrected) in the composite scores of
extrapersonal neglect between patients with or without a lesion in these voxels. L = left; R = right.
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Discussion
Our study is the first to follow the evolution of anosognosia for
hemiplegia from stroke onset to 6 months later, using a systematic
assessment of the same neurological and neuropsychological func-
tions at different time points. Anosognosia for hemiplegia was
clearly a transient phenomenon that tended to disappear with
time, hence both its frequency and clinical presentation may
vary depending on when patients are evaluated. Anosognosia
for hemiplegia was very rare but still possible in the chronic
phase (5%), while it was very common in the early hours and
days after stroke. Unfortunately, some patients could not undergo
testing across all three periods due to clinical constraints. Although
this is unlikely to have produced systematic biases in our measures,
this recruitment variability might nevertheless constitute a possible
limitation for longitudinal comparisons in our study. Furthermore,
due to this longitudinal view, our assessment had to take into
account mild or slight motor impairment that could eventually
disappear in subsequent examinations. This constraint and the
fact that the diagnosis of anosognosia for hemiplegia is purely
clinical might influence our measure of the frequency and severity
of anosognosia for hemiplegia, despite our efforts to use the most
objective and systematic approach as possible (see ‘Materials and
methods’ section). Nevertheless, we believe that these issues were
unlikely to produce major effects on the overall pattern of results
and were also partly unavoidable when conducting a longitudinal
study such as ours. Taken together, our results provide novel
insights into the clinical course of anosognosia for hemiplegia as
well as its neurocognitive and neuroanatomical underpinnings and
therefore add important constraints for theoretical accounts of
anosognosia for hemiplegia.
Prevalence and clinical manifestations
In the first week after stroke (subacute phase), frank anosognosia
for hemiplegia (e.g. Bisiach score 2) was observed in 18% of our
patients, in agreement with the rate reported by Baier and Karnath
(2005), but this prevalence reached 32% within the first 3 days,
and even 60% within the first few hours based on retrospective
interviews. Indeed, it is striking that only one-third of our patients
clearly reported a neurological cause for their symptoms when
interrogated after admission, in sharp contrast with their correct
description of the situational context (i.e. place, time, persons).
Although the latter result is purely descriptive and might be
either underestimated due to third-person reports or overesti-
mated due to memory failure, this notion of poor insight at the
very onset of stroke symptoms is consistent with other clinical
reports (Grotta and Bratina, 1995) and suggests that anosognosia
might be considered as a ‘usual’ state after severe brain damage.
A more sustained and ‘typical’ form of anosognosia may then
persist when lesions produce additional deficits in neural systems
implicated in motor monitoring. In our study, anosognosia for
hemiplegia was rare in the chronic period, although several chronic
cases have been well documented in the literature (Cocchini et al.,
2002; Davies et al., 2005).
Other measures of anosognosia for hemiplegia based on our
modified Feinberg scale and auto-evaluations of simple motor
activities (the Marcel task) also indicated a high rate of under-
estimation of contralesional weakness, affecting 40–50% of
patients in both the hyperacute and subacute assessments.
These figures might reflect minor forms of anosognosia, involving
a failure to monitor and adjust to current state, rather than a true
‘denial’ of paralysis (Baier and Karnath, 2005). Nevertheless, these
different measures of unawareness of motor deficits were highly
correlated with each other at all stages (hyperacute, subacute or
chronic) and revealed highly specific impairments in motor
function.
Indeed, the auto-evaluation of motor performance on uniman-
ual left and bimanual tasks was not only poor both prior and after
confrontation with the task, but showed no correlation with the
(relatively preserved) auto-evaluation of the same patients for
their verbal fluency performance. This suggests two different
monitoring mechanisms for each domain or a different role of
fixed beliefs in making these judgements, because manual tasks
involved familiar actions whereas fluency entailed a new cognitive
exercise. Even more strikingly, we found that measures of ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia were not significantly correlated with ano-
sognosia for visuospatial neglect, as estimated by the Bergego
scale (Bergego et al., 1995), in either the subacute or chronic
phases. This dissociation does not support the notion of a dys-
function or disconnection involving a single cerebral system for
awareness (as proposed by McGlynn and Schacter, 1989), but
rather suggests a distinct neural basis for the self-monitoring of
motor abilities. Although it is possible that both anosognosia for
hemiplegia and anosognosia for neglect may reflect a tendency of
patients to believe that their current state accords with their past
abilities (Marcel, 2004; Vuilleumier 2004), the discrepancy
between unawareness of motor and spatial deficits highlights the
specificity of each disorder.
Finally, we found a high prevalence of related disorders in bodily
awareness (62, 58 and 42% of patients showed at least one such
phenomenon in the hyperacute, subacute and chronic phases, re-
spectively), with the most common symptoms being anosodia-
phoria, kinaesthetic illusions and strangeness feelings. This high
frequency is likely to reflect our systematic evaluation and sug-
gests that these phenomena may often be otherwise missed.
However, only a few of these disturbances correlated with the
presence of anosognosia for hemiplegia. Such correlation con-
cerned anosodiaphoria for plegia (in the hyperacute more than
subacute phase), as well as kinaesthetic illusions and
non-belonging (in the subacute more than hyperacute phase).
The latter distortions in bodily awareness are intimately related
to the nature of anosognosia for hemiplegia, since hallucinations
of movement may promote anosognosia by depriving patients
from incongruent feedback necessary to discover their deficit,
and impaired awareness of deficit may in turn reduce emotional
distress (anosodiaphoria). Importantly, the association with kinaes-
thetic illusions suggests that motor intentional processes are not
necessarily suppressed in anosognosia for hemiplegia (Feinberg
et al., 2000). However, these associations were relatively weak,
and similar disorders were often reported by patients without
anosognosia for hemiplegia, indicating that they may represent
worsening factors or ‘collateral deficits’ but be neither sufficient
nor necessary to directly induce anosognosia for hemiplegia.
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Overall, these data highlight the selectivity of unawareness for
motor deficits, but also underscore the clinical heterogeneity of
associated symptoms.
Correlations with other neurological and
neuropsychological disorders
A wide range of tests was administered to patients to investigate
sensorimotor and cognitive functions at different stages post-
stroke. Although the choice and number of tests was necessarily
limited in order to be administered at the bedside in the hyper-
acute and subacute phases, our prospective approach in a large
group of patients allowed us to identify the pattern of neurological
and neuropsychological deficits associated with anosognosia for
hemiplegia, and to track their evolution in parallel to the remission
of anosognosia for hemiplegia over time.
For both the hyperacute and subacute periods, we found that
the degree of anosognosia for hemiplegia (on different measures)
was highly correlated with the severity of several neurological
disorders (particularly anaesthesia, proprioceptive loss and visual
extinction) and neuropsychological disorders (particularly disorien-
tation and visuospatial neglect). These correlations were similar
when we controlled for differences in the severity of the motor
impairment by taking only patients with full hemiplegia. Multiple
regression analyses further indicated that proprioceptive loss and
spatial neglect played the most important role (in the hyperacute
and subacute phases, respectively). Impaired vigilance and motor
weakness were also correlated with anosognosia for hemiplegia
but only moderately. These observations are congruent with the
view that multiple factors may underlie this syndrome
(Vuilleumier, 2004; Orfei et al., 2007), and that deficient ‘appre-
ciation’ of the current state of the paralysed limb due to impaired
proprioception or neglect might be a critical factor (Levine, 1990;
Vuilleumier, 2004). Moreover, our factorial analysis suggested that
the presence of anosognosia for hemiplegia tended to co-occur
with these neurological and neuropsychological disturbances,
whereas other deficits tended to occur separately—including hemi-
anopia, memory deficit, hypovigilance and even personal neglect.
The latter segregation of personal neglect into a distinct factor is
particularly striking, as it indicates that it is not only different from
extrapersonal neglect and proprioceptive deficits (Committeri
et al., 2007), but also unlikely to significantly contribute to ano-
sognosia for hemiplegia.
In addition, we found no reliable correlation with motor extinc-
tion, again suggesting that intentional motor processes may not
necessarily be impaired in anosognosia for hemiplegia, in keeping
with the frequent reports of kinaesthetic illusions (see above).
Likewise, anosognosia for hemiplegia was unrelated to simple
tests of frontal lobe functions (flexibility and fluency) and only
weakly related to memory and global cognitive functioning. The
latter functions were also found to be not significant in other
studies (Starkstein et al., 1992; Davies et al., 2005). Taken to-
gether, these results indicate that the cognitive disorders prevent-
ing the ‘discovery’ of paralysis in the context of an impaired
appreciation of motor performance are likely to involve more
specific abilities than these classic executive functions.
Importantly, we note that even though a few deficits (such as
proprioceptive loss, spatial neglect, disorientation) showed a con-
sistent co-occurrence with anosognosia for hemiplegia, this does
not imply a direct causative role. Despite significant correlations,
we observed a few patients demonstrating double dissociations
between these deficits and anosognosia for hemiplegia.
Furthermore, the number rather than just the nature of deficits
in a patient appeared to predict the presence of anosognosia for
hemiplegia. This pattern argues for a multi-componential model of
anosognosia, but in which no single deficit is either sufficient or
necessary to produce anosognosia for hemiplegia. Instead, differ-
ent cocktails of deficits in different patients may lead to similar
impairment in discovering and reporting plegia.
Purely psychological measures (auto- and hetero-questionnaires
on personality and emotional traits) did not reveal any pattern
systematically associated with anosognosia for hemiplegia. The
only significant behaviours reported more often by the nurses in
anosognosics were confabulations and passivity, as well as to a
lesser degree a lack of interest, absence of worries and indiffer-
ence. All these behaviours are closely related to the definition of
anosognosia for hemiplegia itself and converge with the frequent
association of anosodiaphoria (see above). However, these behav-
iours were mainly noted in the hyperacute but not subacute stage.
This suggests that they might represent factors correlating with
the ‘risk’ of developing anosognosia for hemiplegia, but not be
necessarily present and causally linked with anosognosia for hemi-
plegia. Furthermore, we found no relation to states of anxiety,
mood (depression or mania), angriness and even tendency to
show or not show catastrophic reactions. Likewise, a measure of
optimistic traits did not indicate any premorbid dispositional bias to
positiveness. Hence, anosognosics made unrealistic judgements
concerning their motor performance and recovery, but this ‘opti-
mism’ was limited to their neurological motor ability rather than a
more general attitude or personality trait. Taken together, these
results do not support the suggestion that anosognosia for hemi-
plegia reflects a particular affective reaction to the distress induced
by the deficits, although they do not rule out that emotional and
motivational factors might contribute to unawareness or denial of
motor weakness. More generally, our data do not support theor-
etical accounts of anosognosia for hemiplegia that attribute
unawareness to a single cause (such as spatial or personal neglect,
sensory loss, frontal dysexecutive syndrome or general optimism),
even though some disturbances are more commonly associated
with anosognosia for hemiplegia than others.
Evolution of anosognosia for hemiplegia
Because our prospective survey included two evaluations in the
early time window post-stroke onset, when the greatest remission
rate of anosognosia occurs, we were able to observe the evolution
of anosognosia for hemiplegia in parallel to other impairments. As
expected, all neurological and neuropsychological deficits im-
proved after the first week. Even though the rate of improvement
was generally similar across the different deficits, the pattern of
decreases for anosognosia for hemiplegia was mainly correlated
with the degree of change in proprioceptive loss, visuospatial neg-
lect, disorientation and hemianopia. In other words, patients who
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showed the best/worst recovery from anosognosia were those
who also showed the best/worst remission in these symptoms.
These results on the timecourse of anosognosia for hemiplegia
thus converge with those of our multiple regression analysis and
further highlight the role of proprioception disorders and neglect in
anosognosia for hemiplegia during subacute stages.
Moreover, it is possible that different factors are crucial at dif-
ferent times. In the hyperacute phase, the more discriminative
factor was proprioception, while neglect appeared more discrim-
inative in the subacute phase. These results converge with the
above to suggest that none of these neurological impairments
alone is sufficient for anosognosia for hemiplegia, but the presence
of multiple deficits might be needed to combine together in
order to produce anosognosia for hemiplegia, with the relative
importance of each factor depending on the severity of other
concomitant deficits.
Finally, we found that anosognosia for hemiplegia was very
uncommon in the chronic stage. Only one patient was still
anosognosic at the 6-month follow-up. Nevertheless, the presence
of anosognosia for hemiplegia phenomena (as measured by our
composite score) was still significantly associated with neglect, but
also related to more global impairments in cognitive functions
(including memory and orientation).
Anatomical substrates
In agreement with clinical findings suggesting a multifactorial
origin, our voxel-based lesion mapping analysis revealed that
anosognosia for hemiplegia was associated with damage to a se-
lectively distributed set of brain regions. Note that our statistical
mapping approach (Bates et al., 2003; Verdon and Vuilleumier,
2010) took into account the relative degree of severity of anosog-
nosia for hemiplegia, using a continuous value (based on a
composite score from two complementary scales) rather than a
dichotomous classification between patients with and without
anosognosia for hemiplegia and based on an arbitrary cut-off
threshold (obtained from a single scale). This differs from previous
attempts to identify the neuroanatomical substrates of anosogno-
sia (e.g. Bisiach et al., 1986; Berti et al., 2005; Karnath et al.,
2005), which generally compared the overlap of lesions between
two groups of patients (with versus without the disorder). Our
approach might therefore be more sensitive in reflecting the
clinical variety and heterogeneity of anosognosia.
For anosognosia for hemiplegia in the earliest period, we found
that lesions affecting the insula (particularly its anterior part), as
well as the anterior internal capsule and anterior paraventricular
white matter (extending into the rostral caudate nucleus) were the
most distinctive in discriminating anosognosics from nosognosics.
Additional lesions in premotor areas, dorsal cingulate, parietotem-
poral cortex and medial temporal lobe (hippocampus and amyg-
dala) were associated with a more persistent disorder in the later
period after 1 week. Because the lesion mapping was based on
neuroimaging data acquired during the first week, these results
suggest that anosognosia for hemiplegia may emerge in the
hyperacute phase when these additional brain areas are dysfunc-
tional (due to ischaemic penumbra or diaschisis) but subsequently
remain spared, while anosognosia for hemiplegia tends to persist
in the subacute phase only when larger structural lesions are
constituted, touching multiple specific regions. Consistent with
this, a correlation between anosognosia for hemiplegia and total
lesion size became significant only in the subacute phase.
Our findings for the hyperacute phase converge with the recent
report of Karnath et al. (2005) that insula damage is common in
patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia. In the latter study, the
posterior part of the insula was found to be the most critical lesion
area for anosognosia for hemiplegia, but using a different statis-
tical mapping method. The insula is implicated in body ownership,
perceived agency and interoceptive representations of body states
(Craig, 2002, 2009; Critchley et al., 2004). In addition, its anterior
part is also involved in error monitoring (Magno et al., 2006;
Taylor et al., 2007) and in the processing of uncertainty (Harris
et al., 2008). Thus, together with the anterior cingulate cortex and
basal ganglia, the insula plays a key role in brain circuits necessary
for monitoring performance and promoting behavioural adjust-
ments (Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2006). These structures
were also more frequently damaged in patients with anosognosia
for hemiplegia, along with white matter connections in subcortical
frontal regions. Damage to these circuits could therefore disrupt
the neural systems normally responsible for the monitoring of
motor actions and errors (Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010). Such a
disruption may prevent the cognitive and affective processing
necessary for an appropriate adjustment of beliefs and checks in
response to abnormal appreciation of sensorimotor state.
However, our lesion mapping results for the subacute phase
revealed that other structures were also important for sustained
anosognosia, including premotor areas as well as more posterior
temporal and parietal areas. These findings agree with the recent
study of Berti et al. (2005) suggesting a crucial role for the
premotor cortex in anosognosia for hemiplegia (unlike Karnath
et al., 2005). According to these authors, premotor areas may
not only mediate motor initiation and preparation but also gener-
ate a corollary signal that then serves to monitor and adjust
ongoing movements by comparing a feedforward copy of motor
commands with feedback information received through proprio-
ception (Blakemore et al., 2002). An impairment of this premotor
area may prevent a detection of mismatch between the intended
movement and the actual lack of movement in patients with
anosognosia for hemiplegia. In this framework, the intention is
intact as demonstrated by the preservation of proximal muscle
activity on EMG (Berti et al., 2007; Fotopoulou et al., 2008).
In addition, damage to the right temporoparietal junction is
consistent with classic neuropsychological studies that reported
that anosognosia for hemiplegia and asomatognosia are
common disorders after parietal lobe lesions (Bisiach et al.,
1986; Feinberg et al., 1990). The right temporoparietal junction
is critically implicated in spatial attention (e.g. Halligan et al.,
2003), and damage to this region leads to left hemispatial neglect
(Mort et al., 2003). Accordingly, neglect has often been suspected
to play an important role in anosognosia for hemiplegia (Cutting,
1978; Hier et al., 1983; Bisiach et al., 1986; Starkstein et al.,
1992; Vuilleumier, 2000) and the current study clearly demon-
strates that extrapersonal neglect is one of the major neuropsy-
chological disorders correlating with both the severity and
timecourse of anosognosia for hemiplegia. In contrast, we found
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that personal neglect was not associated with anosognosia for
hemiplegia and may have distinct anatomical correlates
(Committeri et al., 2007). Furthermore, a subcortical extension
of lesions into the parietal white matter may be particularly harm-
ful because it could produce both spatial neglect and propriocep-
tive loss due to the convergence of different fibre tracts—a
combination of deficits that was commonly associated with
anosognosia for hemiplegia in our study. Anosognosia for
hemiplegia has also been reported after subcortical lesion due to
right thalamic (Karussis et al., 2000) or capsular-lenticular strokes
(Bisiach et al., 1986; de la Sayette et al., 1995), which might
induce frontal or parietal dysfunction due to disconnection or
diaschisis. Notably, our VLSM analysis found that the anatomical
correlates of extrapersonal neglect partly overlapped but were also
clearly distinct from those of anosognosia for hemiplegia.
A less expected finding in our study was the correlation of
anosognosia for hemiplegia with damage to the amygdalo-
hippocampal complex in the medial temporal lobe. These regions
are known to play a key role in memory and emotion. The hippo-
campus subserves the encoding of events in episodic memory
(Squire, 1992) and lesions in this area disrupt the integration of
new information into autobiographical knowledge. The amygdala
is a structure critically implicated in emotional processing and
learning (see Phelps and LeDoux, 2005 for a review), with a par-
ticular importance for fear (Ohman and Mineka, 2001) and, more
generally, for the appraisal of self-relevant stimuli (Sander et al.,
2003). Thus, lesions to this structure may cause a loss of fear
responses (Adolphs et al., 2005) as well as an incapacity to take
into account various forms of feedback that are relevant for sub-
sequent behavioural adjustments (Ousdal et al., 2008). In the case
of anosognosia, it is tempting to speculate that damage to these
two structures could lead to deficient processing of the abnormal
or threatening feedback generated by a paralysed limb and motor
failures, as well as to greater forgetfulness of these events.
Consistent with this hypothesis, our results indicated a mild
correlation between memory difficulties and anosognosia in the
subacute (1 week) and chronic (6 months) phases. Moreover, a
previous study on emotional behaviour in acute stroke showed
that subjective reports of fear were reduced in anosognosic
patients (Ghika-Schmid et al., 1999).
To summarize, our results do not only extend but also reconcile
the apparent discrepancies between previous studies on the neural
bases of anosognosia, which variably pointed to the parietal lobe
(Bisiach et al., 1986), insula (Karnath et al., 2005) or premotor
areas (Berti et al., 2005). We show that no single brain area seems
to be sufficient by itself to produce anosognosia for hemiplegia.
Indeed, no single region was damaged in 100% of patients with
anosognosia. Rather, a complex network of interacting cerebral
regions seems likely to be implicated in the occurrence and per-
sistence of this disorder. The critical lesions might also act by dis-
connecting white matter pathways between subcortical and
cortical areas in both anterior and posterior brain regions. In
agreement with this, two recent meta-analyses (Pia et al., 2004;
Orfei et al., 2007) proposed that anosognosia for hemiplegia
could result from damage to neural circuits between parietal,
frontal and subcortical regions that are thought to subserve
motor awareness. Alternatively, the convergent evidence from
clinical and anatomical results in our study indicate that lesions
within this network may lead to a combination of deficits affecting
proprioception, spatial attention, motor programming, action
monitoring, memory and/or affective processes, consistent with
the view that anosognosia for hemiplegia reflects a multi-
component disorder. Each of these functions may potentially be
affected in anosognosia for hemiplegia, but perhaps to different
degrees or with different combinations in different patients.
However, it must be noted that anatomo-functional mapping
results in our study, like those of all previous studies, were based
on structural lesion data, often acquired in post-acute stages,
whereas functional defects in regional cerebral blood flow have
not been systematically examined during the subacute stage,
when anosognosia for hemiplegia is more frequent and more
severe. Future studies should exploit perfusion-based measures
of brain activity to clarify the critical changes associated with
anosognosia for hemiplegia and its clinical fluctuation in the
early days after stoke.
Conclusion
Our prospective assessment of anosognosia for hemiplegia in a
large group of patients with right-brain damage provides import-
ant insights about its multi-factorial determinants and temporal
evolution. Several deficits were found to distinguish patients
who were unaware or aware of their hemiplegia, involving neuro-
logical functions (i.e. proprioceptive loss, most notably in the
hyperacute phase) as well as neuropsychological functions (e.g.
visuospatial neglect, but also disorientation and memory impair-
ment, most notably in the subacute phase). The latter deficits may
play a key role in the production of anosognosia for hemiplegia,
even though different ‘cocktails’ of deficits could potentially arise
in different patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia. By contrast,
we found that personal neglect, basic frontal lobe functions and
purely psychological factors such as optimism or mood changes
did not play a significant role. In accord with the notion of a
multi-component syndrome, our anatomical mapping results
further indicated that anosognosia for hemiplegia was associated
with distributed multifocal lesions, including insula and anterior
subcortical/basal ganglia regions, cingulate and premotor cortex,
temporoparietal areas and amygdalo-hippocampal structures.
These lesions could lead to deficits in interoceptive representations
of bodily states, self-monitoring, motor programming and feedfor-
ward control and spatial attention, as well as emotional processing
and learning, which might add up or interact together to disrupt
motor awareness. Different degrees of damage to each of these
components might also lead to different forms of anosognosia for
hemiplegia and thus underlie some dissociations or variations in its
clinical manifestations, such as between full denial and anosodia-
phoria or between implicit and explicit recognition of the deficit
(Vocat and Vuilleumier, 2010).
These results are broadly consistent with the recent ‘two-fac-
tors’ theory (Davies et al., 2005) or ABC hypothesis (Vuilleumier,
2004) of anosognosia for hemiplegia, according to which an
impairment in one or many components necessary for the ‘appre-
ciation’ of the deficit (e.g. proprioception and spatial attention)
3594 | Brain 2010: 133; 3578–3597 R. Vocat et al.
might cause anosognosia for hemiplegia (or not) depending on the
severity of additional dysfunction in ‘belief’ or ‘check’ components
(e.g. related to monitoring or affective processes). Thus, in some
cases, anosognosia for hemiplegia might primarily arise due to a
severe disruption of check components despite minor losses in
proprioception and a lack of neglect. This ABC combinatorial
rule would be consistent with the occasional double dissociations
observed (in our study and others) between anosognosia for hemi-
plegia and some deficits that are otherwise strongly correlated
with anosognosia for hemiplegia (e.g. spatial neglect). However,
the exact cognitive processes underlying each of the ABC compo-
nents and their neuroanatomical correlates still remain to be better
characterized. Future studies will need to explore more specific
abilities associated not only with sensory and motor functions,
but also related to reasoning, belief formation, error monitoring
and affective processing.
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